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Musical Sound Recordings as Works
Made for Hire: Money for Nothing
and Tracks for Free
By ScoTt T. OKAMOTO*
ENVISION THE FOLLOWING scenario representative of a modern
music relationship:' a budding recording artist lands his first big re-
cord contract with a major label in November 2003 and agrees to re-
cord songs to be included in a ten-song album. The contract states
that whatever the artist produces will be considered a "work made for
hire."2 The record company advances him funds (which the Company
will recoup out of the sales3), and provides the artist with a studio,
producer, engineer, and other accompanying musicians. The artist
writes the musical compositions for the album and the drummer lays
down the drum tracks in January of 2004. The bass parts are recorded
in February of the same year, followed by the guitars in March, the
percussion in April, the keyboards in May, the lead vocals in June, the
* Class of 2004. The author would like to thank his parents for their love,
confidence, and support. He would also like to thank John Lister and Alexa Koenig for
their assistance and patience in editing, and Jeff Slattery, Josh Binder, and David Franklyn
for their input on drafts of this Comment.
1. See generally Joseph B. Anderson, The Work Made For Hire Doctrine and California
Recording Contracts: A Recipefar Disaster, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 587, 593-94 (1995)
(describing a modern relationship between record company and recording artist).
2. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "work made for hire"); 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(1994) (stating that ownership and authorship of copyright in a work made for hire will
vest in "the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared"). In this Com-
ment, "work for hire" and the statutory construction "work made for hire" are used
interchangeably.
3. See generally SIDNEY SHEMEL & M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKv, TIts BUSINESS OF Music:
13-14 (8th ed. 2000) (stating that the record company will generally pay all fees associated
with the recording including payments to the artist, arranger, copyist, engineers, techni-
cians, studio musicians, producer, and studio). In addition, the company will pay all pro-
duction, marketing, editing, manufacturing, distributing, touring, and any other costs
associated with producing and selling the album. In return, the record company will count
the costs of production and of any advance paid to the artist against the profit gleaned
from the sale of the album. Thus, until the record company makes all of its money back,
the artist will get nothing (beyond the original advance-this the company will settle for a
loss). See Anderson, supra note 1, at 590-91 (regarding the "advancement-recoupment-
royalty" system).
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horns in July, the background vocals in August, and the incidental
sound effects in October. While the artist has a basic conception of
how each track should sound, each is largely a creation from the mind
of the individual musician and could be individually copyrightable.
The songs recorded over the course of the previous ten months are
mixed in November of 2004, mastered in December, and delivered to
the record company. The record company receives the master record-
ings and, assuming the songs are "commercially satisfactory," 4 selects
which ten will be included on the first album. After the company has
selected and arranged the songs that will make the cut, it releases the
artist's first album with great fanfare. 5
After many years have passed, the artist has produced multiple
albums by this same mechanism and has "made it big" in the en-
tertainment world. Unfortunately, his relationship with the record
company sours and he demands the return of his master recordings.
The record company, however, insists that his product is a "work for
hire" owned by the company. Either he is an employee of the record
company, or since the recording contract stated that his works would
be works made for hire and because both the individual songs and the
album fall within the statutory definitions of a "compilation" and "col-
lective work,' 6 the artist is out of luck. The record company owns the
copyrights to all the songs and all albums produced in perpetuity.
This scenario illustrates but one way sound recordings can be
considered works for hire under modern copyright law. Despite the
absence of the term "sound recording" from the statutory definition
of a work made for hire, this Comment argues that a sound recording
can still qualify for work for hire status under the statute, thus irrepa-
4. DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED To KNoW ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS 125
(1997), quoted in Ryan Ashley Rafoth, Note: Limitations of the 1999 Work-For-Hire Amendment:
Courts Should Not Consider Sound Recordings to Be Works-For-Hire When Artists' Termination
Rights Begin Vesting in Year 2013, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1034 (2000); see aLso 6 MELVILLE B.
NIMMF & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMEIR ON COPYRIGHT § 30.03A(l)(6.3) (2002) [hereinafter
NIMMER] ("[the record l]abel will not be obligated to accept the delivery of any Master
Recordings which it determines are not technically and commercially satisfactory for the
manufacture and sale of Phonograph Records").
5. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining phonorecords as:
material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion pic-
ture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later de-
veloped, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
"phonorecords" includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.).
Thus the term "phonorecord" encompasses analog tape, digital tape, mini-disc, reel-to-
reel, 8-track, and even mp3 formats, in addition to compact discs.
6. See id.; see aLdo discussion infra, Part IV.
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rably altering the artist's right to control the fruits of his genius. This
Comment argues that both an individual song and an album can be
deemed works for hire if either the artist is an employee and created
the songs or album within the scope of his or her employment, or the
processes of their creation fit the statutory definition for a collective
work or compilation. This argument hinges on the process involved in
creating either the individual song or the album. If the process is
deemed to result in a compilation or a collective work, work for hire
status should attach to the detriment of the artist but to the benefit of
the record company.
Part I of this Comment discusses the background of copyright law
and the purpose of awarding copyrights to original creations as
granted by the United States Constitution. Part II discusses the work
for hire doctrine as it relates to copyright as a whole and the music
industry in particular. Part III discusses the first part of the statutory
definition of a work made for hire-the employer-employee distinc-
tion and the "within the scope of employment" tests. Part IV discusses
the independent contractor prong of the work for hire statute and
argues that musical sound recordings can be made works for hire as
either a "collective work" or "compilation" even if created by an inde-
pendent contractor. Part V proposes comprehensive factors to apply
when examining whether a musical sound recording should be
deemed a work for hire.
I. The Goal of Copyright
The United States Constitution permits Congress to make laws
that "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 7 From this clause and from the
Necessary and Proper Clause,8 Congress derives federal power to en-
act copyright legislation.9
"The primary purpose of copyright is not to reward the author,
but is rather to secure 'the general benefits derived by the public from
the labors of authors.""'' Although "[t]he prospect of reward is an
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. See generally U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 18 (Congress shall have the power "[t]o
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the forego-
ing Powers.").
9. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.02.
10. Id. § 1.03 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
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important stimulus for thinking and writing,"'1I the Supreme Court
has said that "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of au-
thors."'12 Thus, the United States Copyright Office grants a limited
monopoly through copyrights to authors to protect their works of ge-
nius, 13 and does so on a national scale. 14 The public gains access to
the fruits of the creative intellect, and creators are given exclusive
rights to control their work, 15 providing incentives to create.
A. The Copyright Clause
While the entire Copyright Clause has been the subject of exten-
sive academic and judicial dissection, two phrases in particular are rel-
evant to this discussion. "Author" means not only the narrow
definition of a writer, "but rather [has] reach necessary to reflect the
broad scope of constitutional principles."16 "[T]he term, in its consti-
tutional sense, has been construed to mean an 'originator," 'he to
whom anything owes its origin."' 1 7 Thus, under this broad construc-
tion, an "Author" means anybody who creates an original work; that is,
produces something "of one's own independent efforts"1 , that has at
least "a modicum of intellectual labor,"'1 regardless of the medium of
expression. Therefore, a musician is undoubtedly an "Author."
"[T] o their respective Writings" has been construed as broadly as
"Authors." A "Writing" can be "any physical rendering of the fruits of
creative intellectual or aesthetic labor,"2 1 produced in a tangible
form,2 1 including musical compositions and sound recordings of
11. Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1541 (7th Cir. 1990).
12. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
13. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (1994) ("All administrative functions and duties
under this title ... are the responsibility of the Register of Copyrights as director of the
Copyright Office ....").
14. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973). The Court goes on to state,
however, that "the States have not relinquished all power to grant to authors 'the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings.'" Id. at 560.
15. See generally Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(quoting U.S. CoNs-r. art. I, § 8, cl. 8) ("[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to
reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts'").
16. 1 NIMMER, supira note 4, § 1.06(A).
17. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (quoting Burrows-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53, 58 (1884)).
18. 1 NIMMER, sln/ra note 4, § 1.06(A).
19. Id.
20. Goldlstein, 412 U.S. at 561.
21. See I NIMMER, supra note 4, § 108(C) (2); see also Canadian Admiral Corp. v. Redif-
fusion, Inc., [1954] Ex. C.R. 382, 383 (Can. Fed. Ct.) (cited in I NIMMER, supra note 4,
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those compositions. While myriad qualifications abound, "[t]he two
fundamental criteria of copyright protection [are] originality and fixa-
tion in tangible form. '22 "[0]riginality," the Supreme Court stated in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 23 "is not a stringent
standard; it does not require that facts be presented in an innovative
or surprising way."2 4 Additionally, "[ol]riginality sufficient for copy-
right protection exists if the 'author" has introduced [a] ny element of
novelty as contrasted with the material previously known to him."25
Thus, the basic rule is that if a person creates an original work in
tangible form with at least a quantum of intellectual labor, that person
owns, and therefore controls, the copyright. The result of owning a
copyright is that the copyright holder is entitled to exclusive control
over reproduction, distribution, creation of derivative works, public
display, and performance for the amount of time defined by statute.2"6
B. History of Sound Recording Copyright
Pursuant to the Copyright Clause, the First Congress issued copy-
rights to "authors of any map, chart, book or books already printed."27
Musical compositions were added to the list of copyrightable materials
in 1831.28 The Copyright Act of 1870 included as copyrightable, any
"musical composition.., intended to be perfected as works of the fine
arts." 2 1 The Copyright Act of 1909 ("1909 Act") expanded the scope of
copyright, but required that in order for a musical work to acquire
copyright protection, the work had to be reduced to sheet music or
other tangible manuscript form.3 1 In 1971, Congress revised the 1909
Act through the Sound Recording Amendment Act of 1971 ("Act of
1971"),31 thereby extending copyright protection to sound record-
§ 1.08(C)(2)) (stating that a copyrightable "writing" must at least have "some material
form, capable of identification and having a more or less permanent endurance").
22. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), quoted in Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355 (1991).
23. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
24. Id. at 362.
25. Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (N.D.Tex.
1978) (quoting Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1971)).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
27. 1 Stat. 124, cited in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 208 (1954).
28. See 4 Stat. 436, cited in Mazer, 347 U.S. at 208-09.
29. 16 Stat. 212, cited in Mazer, 347 U.S. at 208-09.
30. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.05(A); see also White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co.,
209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908) (holding that in order to constitute a copy worthy of protection there
must be "a written or printed record in intelligible notation").
31. See Sound Recording Amendment Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 392
(1971).
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ings.32 The Department of Justice, commenting on Congress's revi-
sion of the copyright law, stated, "[w]e believe that extending
copyright to reproduction of sound recordings is the soundest; and
• . .the only way in which sound recordings should be protected....
[T] here is an immediate and urgent need for this protection. '33 The
Act of 1971 first added sound recordings to the list of copyrightable
materials. Finally, Congress revised the entire 1909 Act in the Copy-
right Act of 1976 ("1976 Act" or "Copyright Act"), which took effect
on January 1, 1978.34 The 1976 Act embodies the current status of
copyright law with respect to sound recordings. 35
C. Rights of Copyright
A copyright is a valuable piece of intellectual property to own.
With exclusive control over reproduction, distribution, adaptation,
and public display and performance, the owner can market, promote,
assign, transfer, license, sell, grant, or do nothing with the object of
the copyright.
Two important issues regarding copyright law are the duration of
the copyright and the effect of termination of a copyright assignment.
Under the Copyright Act, works created on or after January 1, 1978
are entitled to a copyright for the life of the author plus seventy
years.3 6 Since copyrights are assignable and transferable, if an author
transferred his copyright to another, that other party would own the
copyright until seventy years after the author's death. 7 However, the
Copyright Act also provides the right of the author to terminate a cop-
yright transfer and thereby recover the copyright.38 For copyrights
transferred on or after January 1, 1978, termination can occur thirty-
32. See id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 92-487 at 1570 (1971); S. REP. No. 92-72 at 1570
(1971).
33. H.R. REP. No. 92-487 at 13, cited in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 575
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
34. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
35. Notwithstanding the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L: No.
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108
Stat. 4809 (1994); Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4248
(1992); and Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No 104-
39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). These acts, however, are beyond the scope of this Comment.
36. See 17 U.S.C. § 3 02(a) (1994).
37. See Randy S. Frisch & MatthewJ. Fortnow, Termination of Copyrights in Sound Record-
ings: Is There a Leak in the Record Company Vaults?, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 211, 212
(1993).
38. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994). For cases dealing with termination under the 1909
Act, see Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 621 (2d Cir. 1982) (termi-
nation of licenses in Edgar Rice Burroughs's Tarzan novels); Range Road Music, Inc. v.
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five years after the transfer -  This right to terminate is non-waivable
and cannot be contracted away.40 The rationale for termination is that
it "gives the author a 'second bite of the apple," and protects him
from transfers for which he was inadequately compensated, because it
is often impossible to appraise the value of a work until it has been
exploited."4 1
U. The Work Made for Hire Doctrine
An author does not always get ownership of the copyright. The
"work made for hire" doctrine states, "the employer or other person
for whom the work was prepared is considered the author.., and...
owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright." 42 As such, the hir-
ing party becomes vested with all copyrights that ordinarily would
have vested in the composer or author. The rationale for the work for
hire doctrine is that parties have the right to hire other parties to cre-
ate copyrightable works.
[A]uthorship and ownership [will] vest in the statutory author
[that is, the hiring party], thus allowing clear title and maximum
ability to derive the economic benefits to society and access of the
public to the work. Otherwise, the rights of termination and rever-
sion held by... claimants could result in competing non-exclusive
licenses that make exclusive exploitation of the work impossible.
43
The definition of a "work made for hire" explicitly states that in
order to be considered as such, the work must be:
[A] work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or
a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution
to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovi-
sual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compila-
tion, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test,
or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire. 44
Music Sales Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (termination of license of songs
copyrighted in 1939).
39. See § 203(a) (3).
40. See § 203(a) (5) ("Termination of the [copyright transfer] may be effected not-
withstanding any agreement to the contrary .... "); see also § 304(c) (5) (covering termina-
tion of renewed copyrights; language identical to § 203(a) (5)).
41. Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 37, at 213.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (West 2001).
43. Corey Field, Article, Their Master's Voice? Recording Artists, Bright Lines, and Bowie
Bonds: The Debate Over Sound Recordings as Works made for Hire, 48J. COPYRIGI ISoc'y U.S.A.
145, 155 (2000).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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As Nimmer points out, the "obvious candidate missing from the
foregoing enumeration is 'sound recordings."" 45 One possible reason
for this is that "[a]t the time the work for hire statutes were drafted,
no federal copyright existed for sound recordings, the single (rather
than the album) was the dominant phonorecord format, and the re-
cord industry was not yet a multi-billion dollar industry with the re-
sources to lobby Congress effectively." 46
The work for hire doctrine originated with the 1909 Act. Prior to
that Act, the common law acknowledged the presumption of an em-
ployer's ownership of a copyright created by an employee. 47 "[T]he
principle was advanced that the payment of a salary to an employee
'entitle[d] an employer to all rights to obtain a copyright in any work
performed during the hours for which such salary [was] paid."" 48 In
addition:
[T]he right belonging to that artist who is employed for the pur-
pose of making a work of art so many hours a day, or that literary
producer who is employed for so many hours, should be very dif-
ferent from the right that is held by the independent artist or man
who makes a painting for art's sake.49'
The 1976 Act divided works made for hire between those created
"within the scope of... employment"50 and those "specially ordered
or commissioned. ' 51 However, the effect was the same: "in the case of
works made for hire the employer is considered the author of the
work."52
This shift of rights has immense implications for control of the
copyright,53 transfer of the copyright, 54 renewal of the copyright,55
45. 1 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 5.03(B) (2) (a) (ii).
46. Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 37, at 224.
47. See Marci A. Hamilton, Comment, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under
the 1976 Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1283 (1987).
48. Id. at 1284 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
49. Id. (citing 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TH-E 1909 COPYRIGHT Acr- at 65 (E. Brylawski
& A. Goldman eds., 1976)).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
51. Id.
52. H.R. RU,. No. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), cited in Hamilton, supra note 47, at 1293.
53. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (stating that if a copyright is deemed a work
for hire, the artist or creator will not have any exclusive control over the work; such control
will vest in the employer or hiring party).
54. See generally § 201 (d)(1) (1994) ("The ownership of a copyright may be trans-
ferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law .... ").
55. See generally 17 U.S.C.S. § 304(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Lexis Stipp. 2001) (stating that for
works created prior to jantuary 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act, "[iun the case
of'-any work copyrighted ... by an employer for whom such work is made for hire, the
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and termination of the copyright.56 The practical effect of the work
for hire statutes is if a work is deemed made for hire, the employer
gets not only unfettered rights to do with the work what he or she
pleases for the ninety-five or 120 year statutory period, 57 but also is
able to retain the copyright in perpetuity because after the expiration
of the copyright the work would enter the public domain.5 8 Thus, the
creator (not the hiring party) of a work for hire could never be re-
vested with the copyright and would have no standing to sue for
infringement. 59
A. The Music Industry, Sound Recordings, and the Work for Hire
Doctrine
The music industry follows the work for hire doctrine in prac-
tice.6 11 "To offset the financial risk [inherent in sponsoring untested
musical artists], record companies require artists to assign ownership
of their sound recording6' copyrights to the record company in ex-
change for a 'record deal.""' 62 Quite frequently, composers and re-
cording artists "provide their recording and/or songwriting services
pursuant to the 'work made for hire" doctrine."63 The rationale for
this practice is that in addition to the financial burden imposed on
record labels for recording, promoting, and publishing the music,
music publishers and recording companies feel that ownership is eas-
ier than continually relicensing the work from the artist anytime the
record company wants to reissue a work. 64 "Ownership of the music
proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright
in such work for the further term of 47 years").
56. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1994) ("In the case of any work other than a work
niade for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright... is
subject to termination ... thirty-five years from the date of execution of the grant." (em-
phasis added) ).
57. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1994) ("in the case of... a work made for hire,
the copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or... 120
years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first.").
58. See § 203.
59. See Moran v. London Records, Ltd., 827 F.2d 180, 182 (7th Cir. 1987).
60. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (7) (1994) (sound recordings are copyrightable).
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "sound recordings" as "works that result from
the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, . . . regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are
embodied.").
62. Rafoth, supra note 4, at 1027 (2000) (quoting SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKV, supra note 3,
at 3); see also 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (copyrights can be transferred); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
591 (1834).
63. Anderson, supra note 1, at 588.
64. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 589.
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[gives] the publishing companies the right to license it and collect on
it as easily and profitably as possible, both in terms of recordings and
especially sheet music."' 5 "Unlike the typical book publisher's con-
tract, or the show music contract, all copyright rights covering popular
music are customarily assigned to the publishers." 66 The artist will still
receive compensation for the service, usually in the form of royalties.67
However, the work for hire doctrine states that if a work is created
during the scope of one's employment or falls within one of nine cate-
gories of enumerated creations,"" then the work is not owned by the
artist but rather by the record company.
B. The Short-Lived Sound Recording as Work for Hire
Amendment
Congress passed legislation adding "sound recordings" to the list
of enumerated works in 1999.69 However, the legislation immediately
came under fire as hastily constructed and inconsiderate of its effect
on recording artists. 7" The amendment to the definition of works for
hire was buried as a technical amendment in a massive appropriations
bill,7 ' and none of the congressional hearings or speeches reflected
any concern over the impact the addition would have on the music
industry. Legislators debated the broader points of the bill,72 but the
65. Id.
66. SHIEMIFL & KRASIIOvsKY, supra note 3, at 168.
67. See id. at 14.
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (enumerating the creations as: collective work, motion
picture or audiovisual work, translation, supplementary work, compilation, instructional
text, test, answer material for a test, or atlas).
69. See Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999,
S.1948, tit. I § 1011 (d) (1999), incorporated in and passed as, Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (stating, under the heading "Tech-
nical Amendments," "(d) Work Made for Hire: Section 101 of title 17, United States Code,
is amended in the definition relating to work for hire in paragraph (2) by inserting 'as a
sound recording,' after 'audiovisual work'").
70. See Senate Clears Copyright "Work for Hire" Bill for President, 60 Pat. Trademark &
CopyrightJ. (BNA) 656 (2000); 146 CONG. REC. H7772 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2000) (state-
ment of Rep. Conyers: "Without the benefit of committee hearings or other debate, the
change terminated any future interest that artists might have in their sound recordings and
turned them over permanently to the record companies. We have since learned that we
should never do business this way."). See generally Rafoth, supra note 4 (arguing negative
aspects of the bill).
71. See generally Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, supra note 69 (encompass-
ing, in its entirety, 1,174 pages of text).
72. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. E2530 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement of Rep. Sand-
lin addressing the plight of rural hospitals, satellite home viewers, dairy farmers, teachers,
and law enforcement officers, and statement of Rep. Berman addressing the technical
change to the definitions of "satellite carrier" and "cable system").
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section revising the work for hire definition went untouched. Even the
bill's author, Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), glossed over the work for
hire amendment as:
[A] technical and clarifying change to the definition of a "work
made for hire" in section 101 of the Copyright Act. Sound record-
ings have been registered in the Copyright Office as works made
for hire since being protected in their own right. This clarifying
amendment shall not be deemed to imply that any sound record-
ing or any other work would not otherwise qualify as a work made
for hire in the absence of the amendment made by this
subsection. 7 3
Senator Lott's statement, however, runs counter to the extant
statutory law at the time the new legislation was passed,7 4 and also
conflicts with widely accepted common law as well.7 5
In response, Representative Howard Coble (R-NC) introduced
H.R. 5107, 7 6 which, in effect, returned the definition of work made
for hire to the status quo ante. 77 Representative Coble acknowledged
that sound recordings were not statutorily recognized as works made
for hire.78 As a result of hearings held before the House Judiciary Sub-
committee on Courts and Intellectual Property, Representative How-
ard Berman (D-CA) added that several legal scholars voiced opinions
as to "whether sound recordings always, usually, sometimes, or never
fall within the nine pre-existing categories of works eligible to be con-
sidered 'works made for hire."" 79 While one professor stated that "the
contribution of an individual sound recording as one of several selec-
tions on a CD or other album will typically constitute a contribution to
a collective work,"8 1 another stated that, "in a vast majority of in-
stances, sound recordings would fail to qualify as 'contributions to col-
lective works" or as 'compilations."" 8' The Register of Copyrights for
the United States Copyright Office added that, "depending on the
particular facts surrounding its creation, a sound recording might, or
73. 145 CONG. REc. S14712 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1999) (statement of Sen. Lott).
74. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining work made for hire without the in-
clusion of sound recordings).
75. See Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999).
76. Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, H.R. 5107, 106th
Cong. (2000).
77. See 146 CONG. REC. H7244 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2000) (statement of Rep. Coble).
78. See id.
79. 146 CONG. REC. H7245 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2000) (statement of Rep. Berman).
80. Id. (quoting Professor Paul Goldstein, Stanford University Law School).
81. Id. (quoting Professor Marci Hamilton, Cardozo School of Law).
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might not, constitute a contribution to a collective work."' 2 However,
Representative Berman added:
[W]e do not want the removal of the words 'as a sound recording"
from the definition of works-made-for-hire [sic] in Section 101 of
the Copyright Act to be interpreted to preclude or prejudice the
argument that sound recordings are eligible to be works made for
hire within the nine, pre-existing categories. 83
Berman also expressly left open the possibility that "a future Con-
gress, after more extensive deliberation and careful consideration,
could decide whether this legal debate should be resolved through
legislation."8 4
As a result, Congress passed and effected legislation in 2000 that
returned the definition of work for hire to the status quo ante.8 5 Thus,
sound recordings are no longer considered one of the enumerated
works."
The implications of reinstating the old work for hire doctrine on
the music industry are wide-ranging. First, the copyright owner has
the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, make derivative works of,
and publicly display or perform the work.8 7 Although the artist would
receive a royalty for every album sold, the actual control over the work
would reside not with her but with the individual or company for
whom the work was prepared. Second, the copyright will endure for
the life of the artist plus seventy years, but will not be owned by the
artist.88 Third, were the work not considered a work for hire, the artist
could regain her copyright thirty-five years after a contractual assign-
ment by termination of the assignment.89
However, if a musical composition or recording is contractually
deemed a work for hire, all control over the copyright vests in the
"employer or other person for whom the work was prepared."911 Works
82. Id. (quoting Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights for the United States Copy-
right Office).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
379 § 2(a)(1) 114 Stat. 1444, 1444 (2000); see also 146 CONO. REC. S10499 (daily ed. Oct.
12, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
86. See Pub. L. 106-379 § 2(a)(1), 114 Stat. 1444, 1444 (2000).
87. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Lexis Supp. 2001).
89. See Rafoth, supra note 4, at 1027; see also 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (3) (1994) (describing
certain conditions tinder which an author can terminate transfers and licenses (as in the
situation in which the artist is deemed an independent contractor and not an employee).
However, if the work is considered a work made for hire, the author may not terminate.).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
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for hire are non-terminable, and such a copyright would endure for
ninety-five years from publication or 120 years from creation, which-
ever is earlier, after which time the work would pass into the public
domain. 91 The practical effect of these statutory provisions is that
once work for hire copyrights are assigned, an artist will virtually never
again have exclusive control over her work. Thus, the determination
of whether a work is made for hire is crucial to the rights of both the
artist and the record company.
Although sound recordings are no longer one of the enumerated
works for hire, possible constructions of the statute may allow the mu-
sic industry to bring sound recordings under the rubric of a work for
hire. Ambiguity remains within the definition of a work for hire such
that an artist could be considered an employee, and a musical sound
recording can fall under the category of a "collective work" or a "com-
pilation"92 for purposes of the work for hire doctrine.
C. The Problem
Recall the hypothetical situation involving the recording artist
and the record company.93 If the contract were deemed a work for
hire, the record company would own the artist's work forever and
have exclusive rights to do anything it wants with the work, including
discard it. Were the contract not deemed a work for hire, the artist
may, after the thirty-five-year statutory period had expired, offer the
album to other companies. Thus, the problem is in determining
whether the work was made for hire.
The artist's interests lie in the determination that the recordings
produced were not works made for hire because the artist could
regain the copyrights by termination of the assignment.94 If the artist's
success outlives the assignment, other record companies may compete
for the work and the artist can renegotiate for a higher royalty rate.
"Congress intended the right of termination to be a safeguard for new
artists who assign their copyrights at a time when they cannot know
the future value of their work, and their bargaining power is lim-
ited.'"1 5 On the other hand, the record company's interests lie in the
determination that the recordings produced were works for hire; they
would get control over the copyright in perpetuity. If the recordings
91. See 17 U.S.C.S. § 302(c) (Lexis Supp. 2001); see also Rafoth, supra note 4, at 1028.
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
93. See supra at 783.
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (3).
95. Rafoth, supra note 4, at 1022.
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are successful, the company can release and rerelease them in myriad
permutations or terminate further release if unsuccessful.
However, it is not clear what makes a musical work a "work made
for hire. '96 This Comment argues that there are two possible ways for
a musical recording or composition to be considered a work for hire:
first, if it was created either by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment, or second, as a specially ordered or commissioned
work falling into one of nine categories with a written instrument to
back it up. 9 7
III. The Employer-Employee Distinction and the "Within the
Scope of Employment" Prongs of the Work Made
for Hire Doctrine
A. The Employer-Employee Distinction
The Copyright Act defines a "work made for hire" first as "a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment. ' However, the Copyright Act does not further define what
"employee" means. Federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
have addressed the issue, eventually arriving at the standard set forth
in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.?9
1. Control Tests
In Clarkstown v. Reeder" "' and Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel,
Inc.,""' the District Court for the Southern District of New York and
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, respectively, arrived at
similar tests for determining whether a hired party was acting as an
"employee" for the purposes of works made for hire.
96. See 146 CONG. REC. S10498 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000) (statement of Senator Hatch):
Sound recordings can be something of a hybrid art form lying on a continuum
between the individual author writing a song or book and the motion picture
where possibly hundreds of employees collaborate on the final work .... Because
the facts can vary so widely ... it is not clear what general rule would be either
most fair to all concerned or would most encourage the continued creativity of
recording artists.
See also Senate Clears Copyright "Work for Hire" Billfor President, supra note 70; Pub. L. No. 106-
379 § 2(a) (1) (2000). For a broad and eloquent background of this issue, see generally
David Nimmer & Peter S. Menell, Sound Recordings, Works for Hire, and the Termination-of-
7Transfers Time Bomb, 49 J. COPVRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 387 (2001).
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
98. Id.
99. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
100. 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
101. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984).
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In Clarkstown, the district court considered precedents arising
under the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act. In evaluating copyright owner-
ship interests in a manual for a youth court, it determined that "the
contributions of others included not only ideas and suggestions but
also direct control and monitoring of Reeder's expression of his own
thoughts."'10 2 The court held that the correct test, based upon prece-
dent of Murray v. Gelderman,103 a case decided under the 1909 Act, was
whether the employer had the right to direct and supervise the man-
ner in which the work was being performed. 1o4 Thus, the right to con-
trol the product became the first test used.
In Aldon Accessories, the Second Circuit, in a dispute over copy-
right ownership in statuettes, held that an employee is one who
"act[s] under the direction and supervision of the hiring author, at
the hiring author's instance and expense .... What matters is whether
the hiring author caused the work to be made and exercised the right
to direct and supervise the creation." 1115 Thus, actual control over the
product became the test in the Second Circuit.
If a case regarding the quality of a work for hire relationship was
decided under either the Clarkstown "right to control" test or the Al-
don Accessories "actual control" test, ownership would likely lean in
favor of the record company: unless artists are so established within
the field that they can exercise complete power over their creative
processes, they will retain only partial control, or no control at all.'°6
The balance of control over the work and the process would be exer-
cised, or at least retained, by the record companies. This would, there-
fore, militate against a finding of the artist as an independent
contractor and could subject the artist to employee status.
2. Agency Test
In Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults of Louisiana, Inc.
v. Playboy Enterprises,10 7 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in a
case involving ownership of certain music videos that for the purposes
of determining employer-employee status, "a work is 'made for hire"
... if and only if the seller is an employee [that is, a servant] within
the meaning of agency law."""' The court therefore adopted the ap-
102. Clarkstown, 566 F. Supp. at 142.
103. 566 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978).
104. See Murray, 566 F.2d at 1310.
105. Aldon Accessories, 738 F.2d at 551.
106. See Rafoth, supra note 4, at 1033.
107. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987).
108. Easter Seal Socy, 815 F.2d. at 334-35.
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proach of the Restatement of Agency.I: 9 The court realized that there
is no federal agency law and thus uniformity might suffer, but that its
holding was favorable over the two previous control tests.'"' The
court's rationale was that the agency test made sense out of the nine
categories of work for hire, and that the work for hire doctrine could
be tied into the common law agency doctrine. In addition, the agency
test would provide predictability because "[i]n most situations it will
not be difficult for a buyer or seller to determine whether the seller is
an employee or an independent contractor, and to structure their
contractual relations accordingly." 1
The effect of this test on the music industry is unclear and will
vary from case to case. Since no one factor is determinative, 1 2 any
court applying this standard will have to resolve the type of relation-
ship that existed between the parties in order to establish copyright
ownership.
3. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, '3 the Supreme
Court attempted, in the context of ownership of a sculpture, to create
a test for determining whether a relationship could be categorized as
that of employer and employee. Weighing the control tests-whether
the employer had either the right to control or actually exerted con-
trol over the employed party-against the common law agency test,
109. See id. at 335; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENcY § 220 (1958) (defining "Servant"
as:
(1) a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with
respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the
other's control or right to control. (2) In determining whether one acting for
another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact,
among others, are considered: (a) the extent of control which, by the agreement,
the master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one
employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupa-
tion, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the
direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill re-
quired in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing
the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method
of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a
part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties be-
lieve they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the
principal is or is not in business).
110. See Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 334.
111. Id. at 335.
112. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989).
113. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
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the Court unanimously determined that the common law agency ap-
proach adopted in Easter Seal Society made the most sense. 1 4 The
Court based its interpretation on the legislative history of the Copy-
right Act, 115 and stated, "interested parties and Congress at all times
viewed works by employees and commissioned works by independent
contractors as separate entities."'" 6 The Court went on to state that
since "Congress intended to provide two mutually exclusive ways for
works to acquire work for hire status: one for employees and the other
for independent contractors, . . . [t]he hiring party's right to control
the product simply is not determinative."' 17
4. Implications of the Reid Test for Sound Recording Works Made
for Hire
Although some commentators have averred that sound record-
ings in general cannot be deemed works made for hire, I" courts have
held differently.' 19 Common sense supports the courts' view as well, as
it is easily conceivable that a company would own a sound bite taken
from a regular employee (for example, a company spokesperson,
whose job it is to give sound bites). However, the application of the
common law agency test is unclear with regard to sound recordings
and the music industry.2 1 It may be evident that a producer or an
engineer on the record company's payroll might be considered an
employee, but with respect to a recording artist, the test blurs. Each of
the agency factors 12 1 may vary from case to case, depending on how
much involvement the record company has in the recording process.
Three factors-the skill required, whether the artist is engaged in a
distinct business, and the method of payment-favor the musician,
114. See id. at 742.
115. See id. at 743.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 747-48.
118. See American Federation of Television and Radio Artists Position on "Work Made
for Hire," at http://www.recordingartistscoalition.com/aftra.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2003) [hereinafter "AFTRA"].
119. See Nat'l Ctr. For Jewish Film v. Goldman, 943 F. Supp. 113, 118 (D.Mass. 1996)
(decided under the 1909 Act) ("Absent [the producer's] urging as the 'motivating factor'
behind the production of the movies.... there would have been no Songs. These facts...
are dispositive of this [work made for hire] aspect of the case."); Warren v. Fox Family
Worldwide, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1067-68 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (including sound record-
ings as works made for hire by the independent contractor prong as audiovisual works).
120. See Peter Jaszi, Letter of Law Professors Opposing Addition of Sound Recordings to Con-
missioned Work Made for Hire Provisions to Renesentative Coble (Mar. 22, 2000), at http://www.
recordingartistscoalition.com/letter.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
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because inevitably the artist is hired specifically for his or her skill and
proficiency within the musical realm, and the payment is per record,
not per hour.122 Since the record company is in the regular business
of creating records, this factor favors the record company. 2: How-
ever, other prongs could vary depending on the contract signed by
the artist and the record company.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held in
Aymes v. Bonelli,' 24 a case involving ownership of copyright in a com-
puter program, that five factors are more relevant than others in de-
termining whether an author is an employee for purposes of the work
for hire doctrine. These are a subset of the Reid factors: "(1) the hir-
ing party's right to control the manner and means of creation; (2) the
skill required; (3) the provision of employee benefits; (4) the tax
treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the
right to assign additional projects to the hired party."' 25 The Aymes
court found the fact that a company failed to pay employment bene-
fits or payroll taxes highly indicative of the fact that the company con-
sidered a computer programmer to be an independent contractor
rather than an employee.' 26 The court also noted "that every case
since Reid that has applied the [Supreme Court's multi-factor] test has
found the hired party to be an independent contractor where the hir-
ing party failed to extend benefits or pay social security taxes."'127
Applying the Aymes standard to the music industry, record compa-
nies typically provide benefits to and pay taxes for their regular em-
ployees, but do not do so for their artists.'28 The "right to control"
prong may go either way in any individual situation and would de-
pend on the level of involvement the record company exerts in the
recording process. The "level of skill" prong would favor the artist
since the recording of a record requires considerable skill, not to
mention the talent required for the artist to get signed to a recording
contract in the first place. As previously discussed, the "employee ben-
efits" and "tax treatment" prongs favor the artist as well, since the re-
cording company rarely pays benefits or taxes for musicians. 21
122. See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 37, at 219.
123. See id. at 220.
124. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
125. Id. at 861.
126. See id. at 862.
127. Id. at 863.
128. See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 37, at 219.
129. See id. (stating that record companies could have agreements with musician un-
ions that require contribution to union's health and retirement fund. However, these ben-
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Whether the hiring party can assign additional projects is an inconclu-
sive factor because the artist is contractually obligated to deliver a set
number of songs or albums and the record company cannot ordina-
rily commission more without additional contract negotiations."'
However, this arguably favors the artist because an artist can decline
additional deals, whereas an employee cannot. Thus, under the Aymes
test and applying the Reid factors, a recording artist will likely not be
found to be an employee of the record company for the purposes of
the work for hire doctrine.
B. The "Within the Scope of Employment" Qualification
If, however, a court determines that the relationship between a
recording artist and a record company can be considered that of em-
ployer-employee within the context of common law agency, the next
question is whether the work produced by that artist was created
within the scope of his or her employment. An employer-employee
relationship alone does not make the created work a work for hire.
Courts have applied the Restatement of Agency test in order to deter-
mine what "within the scope of employment" means.' 3 ' In order to
fall within the scope of an employee's employment, the work must be
the kind of work he is employed to perform; occur substantially within
authorized work hours and space; and be actuated, at least partially,
by a purpose to serve the employer.132
Under these criteria, it is likely that an artist's creation of a song
or songs for an album would be considered created within the scope
of employment. The recording of music is the kind of work an artist is
employed to perform, and is actuated pursuant to a recording con-
tract. However, the work may not occur "within authorized work hours
and space" since artists set their own schedules.' 3 3 Nevertheless, if a
court found that an artist were an employee, it would be difficult to
argue that the artist's recordings were not produced within the scope
of his or her employment. Therefore, a sound recording could be ac-
corded work for hire status.
efits are minimal when compared to those that the record company pays to its regular
employees.).
130. See id.
131. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 5.03(B)(1)(b)(i).
132. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958)).
133. Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 37, at 220.
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IV. A Musical Compact Disc or Phonorecord as a
"Compilation" or "Collective Work"
The second way a creation could be considered a "work made for
hire" as defined by § 101 of the Copyright Act is if the work is specially
ordered or commissioned, falls into one of the nine enumerated cate-
gories, and is supported by a written instrument attesting to that ef-
fect.' 3 4 Generally speaking, record contracts frequently contain
clauses stating that the artist's work is commissioned as work for hire
sufficient to satisfy the written instrument requirement.13 5 In addition,
"recording artists are likely to be considered as 'independent contrac-
tors," "1136 whom record companies specially commission to record
songs; this satisfies the specially ordered or commissioned require-
ment. I3 7 Therefore, the issue is whether a sound recording and, spe-
cifically, a musical compact disc or phonorecord, can fall under any of
the statutory categories.
The Copyright Act lays out nine categories of works that can be
considered works made for hire: (1) contributions to a collective
work; (2) portions of a motion picture or other audiovisual work; (3)
translations; (4) supplementary works; (5) compilations; (6) instruc-
tional texts; (7) tests; (8) answer materials for a test; or (9) atlases.' 3"
A musical compact disc can only fall into four possible categories:
134. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
135. See Rafoth, supra note 4, at 1029 (paraphrasing Anderson, supra note 1, at 588,
592); see also DONALD FARBER, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRAI-S: NEGOTIATING AND
DRAIrING GUIDE, form 159-1 (2001); 6 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 30.03A(2)(10.2); Steven J.
Pena, Composer Agreement, 662 PRACIiCINc; L. INsT. PAT., COYRIGIT, TRADEMARK, AND
LTrERARV PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERiEs 513, 516 (2001). Standard recording contracts
will include language such as the following:
Each Master made pursuant [sic] this Agreement or during its term, from the
inception of its recording, will be considered a "work made for hire" for [the
recording company]; if, for any reason, any such Master fails to qualify ... as a
work made for hire, then all right, title, and interest in and to the copyright shall
be deemed transferred, on an exclusive basis, in perpetuity, to [the record com-
pany] by this Agreement.
6 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 30.03A(2)(10.2); cf Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 37, at 224
("Even if such language is not determinative, it pUts the artist on notice that the copyrights
may not be terminable.").
136. Jaszi, supra note 120.
137. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 593.
138. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
139. An argument could theoretically be made for a translation. For instance, if a re-
cord company specially ordered an artist to make an English version of the song La Vie En
Rose, poptlarized in French by Edith Piaf, then work for hire status might attach.
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contributions to a collective work, 140 portions of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, 14 1 supplementary works, 142 or compila-
tions. 143 Since it is already established that a sound recording can be a
work for hire as an audiovisual work,1 4 4 then setting aside the audiovi-
sual work and supplementary work 145 categories, the question re-
mains: can a phonorecord be classified as a work for hire by
compilation or as part of a collection?
The definition of "compilation," which includes "collective
works,"'146 consists of an original work of authorship resulting from
the selection, coordination, or arrangement of preexisting materi-
als. 14 7 "While a compilation involves merely selection and arrange-
ment, or the bringing together of materials or data which do not
necessarily, but may, be subject to copyright protection individually, a
collective work is a compilation of contributions which would them-
selves be capable of copyright protection." 148 The definition of compi-
lation implies that three elements must be met in order for
140. See § 101 (defining a collective work as "a work.., in which a number of contribu-
tions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a
collective whole").
141. See id. (defining audiovisual works as "works that consist of a series of related
images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such
as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds....
regardless of the nature of the material objects, ... in which the works are embodied," and
defining motion pictures as "audiovisual works consisting of a series of related images
which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, together with accompa-
nying sounds, if any").
142. See id. (defining supplementary work as "a work prepared for publication as a
secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding,
illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other
work, such as ... musical arrangements").
143. See id. (defining a compilation as "a work formed by the collection and assembling
of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way
that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term
'compilation' includes collective works.").
144. See Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1067-68 (C.D.
Cal. 2001).
145. See Rafoth, supra note 4, at 1044 (stating that sound recordings cannot be supple-
mentary unless there are multiple artists on the same album, and then "sound recordings
on an album comprised of various artists' songs are not supplementary works unless a
single artist's songs predominate, making the other sound recordings 'secondary"'); cf
Valerie A. Dearth, 1999 Amendment to Work Made for Hire Doctrine Comes Full Circle: Where It
Came From, What It's Been Through, and Where It Is Now, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215
(2001) (stating a sound recording can, but is not likely to be, a supplementary work).
146. See § 101 ("The term 'compilation' includes collective works.").
147. See id.
148. David E. Rigney, What Constitutes a "Compilation" Subject to Copyright Protection-
Modem Cases, 88 A.L.R. FED. 151, 158 (1988).
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compilation to acquire copyright: (1) the collection and assembly of
preexisting materials or of data; (2) selection, coordination, or ar-
rangement of those materials; and (3) the creation out of those mater-
ials of a work of original, and thus copyrightable, authorship.1 49 "This
tripartite conjunctive structure is self-evident, and should be assumed
to 'accurately express the legislative purpose." "'150
There are two related justifications for considering compilations
as original works entitled to copyright protection.15 ' The first hinges
on the labor expended in their preparation, 152 and the second relies
on the subjective judgment of the author in selecting the materials
that form the compilation.15 However, because a compilation neces-
sarily consists of pre-existing material, the copyright in a compilation
would cover only that material contributed by the author, and does
not cover the underlying material.1'54 This situation would, of course,
not apply were the author of the compilation deemed the author of
the underlying work or transferred the copyrights to those works.' 55
In seeking a copyright for a collective work, the contribution
made to the pre-existing material must be more than trivial. 156 "Origi-
nality in the context of compilations can consist of selectivity, or inde-
pendent original effort in collection, assembling, selecting,
organizing, arranging, and compiling the pre-existing materials."' 157
149. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340, 357 (1991); accord
Key Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Pub. Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 512 (2d Cir. 1991).
150. Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. at 357, (quoting William Patty, Copyright in Compilations of
Facts (or Why the "White Pages" are not Copyrightable), 12 COMM. & L. DEC. 37, 51 (1990)
(citation omitted)).
151. See DowJones & Co. v. Bd. of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
152. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indep. Directory Serv., 371 F.
Supp. 900 (W.D. Ark. 1974) (upholding copyright protection for telephone directory).
153. See, e.g., Adventures In Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places To Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809
(7th Cir. 1942) (upholding copyright for compilation of choice restaurants).
154. See Rigney, supra note 148, at 158-59; see also 17 U.S.C.S. § 103(b) (1994) ("The
copyright in a compilation .. .extends only to the material contributed by the author of
such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material . . .and does not imply any
exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of
... any copyright in the preexisting material.").
155. See Irwin J. Schiffres, Contributions to Collective Works, 18 Am. JUR. 2d COPYRIGHT &
LITERARY PROP. § 65 (1985).
156. See Rigney, supra note 148, at 158-59.
157. Id. at 159.
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A. Musical Albums as "Collective Works" and Therefore
"Compilations"
Numerous cases present situations analogous to the one hypothe-
sized at the beginning of this Comment. Whenever the author has
exercised discretion in the "process of selecting, bringing together,
organizing, and arranging previously existing material," 158 status as a
collective work or compilation will attach. The difference between a
compilation or collective work and a compilation or collective work as
a work for hire is the requirement of special ordering or commission-
ing and the fulfillment of the writing requirement.
Case law supports the finding that a musical sound recording can
be accorded work for hire status, but unfortunately, few cases specifi-
cally address this issue. However, the scarcity of case law is easily ex-
plainable. First, cases in which infringement actions have been
brought and work made for hire has been used as a defense have had
fatal flaws, such as the lack of a signed writing, 159 that have caused the
works to not be deemed works for hire. 16 1 Second, since, under the
Copyright Act, termination rights will not begin to vest until at least
2013 (thirty-five years after the effective date of the current Actl61),
there will be no such cases until that year. 12 Unfortunately, the lack
of case law extends to other areas in which a compilation was found to
be a work for hire, Case law exists in which a work was deemed a work
for hire, and in which a work was deemed a compilation or collective
work, but none entailed a compilation or collection as a work for
hire. 163 One reason is that the issues differ in most cases involving
158. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 57, cited in I NIMMER, supra note 4, § 3.02.
159. See, e.g., Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999) ("[T]here was no
signed written agreement between the parties.").
160. See Ballas, 41 F. Supp. at 541; see also Neva v. Christian Duplications Int'l, Inc., 742
F. Supp. 1533 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that in an action for infringement due to distribu-
tion contrary to recording agreement, implied terms of the contract evinced intent that
the author of the sound recording should retain ownership of the copyright therein).
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3) (1994).
162. See AFTRA, supra note 118, at 8 ("None of these copyright registrations has been
challenged because the issue will not become ripe until 2013, the first year that copyright
owners of sound recordings may exercise their termination rights under the Copyright
Act.").
163. See, e.g., Dahlen v. Mich. Licensed Beverage Ass'n, 132 F. Supp. 2d 574 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (text of poster qualified as compilation); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (dental computer program deemed compilation);
United Tel. Co. v.Johnson Publ'g Co., 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988) (telephone company
white pages section of phone book protectable as compilation); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear,
Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995) (sculpture held to be work for hire); In re Marvel Entm't
Group, Inc., 254 B.R. 817 (D. Del. 2000) (cartoon characters held to be works for hire);
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compilations and works for hire. In work for hire cases, the ownership
of the copyright is at issue. 164 In compilation cases, the ownership of
the compilation is generally not at issue, but rather the ability of the
compilation to withstand infringement claims.' 6 5 However, the step
from compilation to work for hire is only a written instrument away.
Three cases typically cited for holding that sound recordings in
general, and musical sound recordings in particular, cannot be works
made for hire'"" actually hold nothing of the sort. In Ballas v. Ted-
esco,'16 7 a case usually cited for the proposition that a musical sound
recording cannot be a work made for hire,""8 the court held that the
musical CD at issue was not a work made for hire because:
[T]he sound recordings, and the relationship between the parties,
d [id] not fall under either of the two statutory definitions of a work
for hire.... [Additionally,] the sound recordings are not a work
for hire under the second part of the statute because they do not
fit within any of the nine enumerated categories, and because
there was no signed written agreement between the parties.16 9
However, by narrowly tailoring the holding to apply to the musi-
cal CD in question, the court implied that the determination of
whether a sound recording can be deemed a work for hire must be
made situationally.
Second, in Lulirama Ltd., Inc. v. Axcess Broadcasting Services, Inc., 171
the Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary to rule on copyright ownership
Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238 (D.S.C. 1992) (computer programs found to
be works for hire). See generally Rigney, supra note 148, at 164-82 (citing cases in which
products did and did not qualify as compilations); Scott K. Zesch, Application of "Works For
Hire" Doctrine Under Copyright Act of 1976, 132 A.L.R. FED. 301, 332-43 (1996) (citing cases
in which products did and did not qualify as works for hire).
164. See Ballas, 41 F. Supp. at 541; Neva, 742 F. Supp. at 1533.
165. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (phone
books and factual compilations are copyrightable but information contained therein is not,
so infringement claim cannot stand); Key Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Pub. Enters.,
Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (business directory copyrightable as compilation but de-
fendant did not infringe); Roy Exp. Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 672
F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) (short film consisting of classic scenes from movies deemed a
compilation because of skill and creativity of compiler in selecting and arranging the work,
and was subject to protection against infringement).
166. See AFTRA, supra note 118, at 6; Field, supra note 43, at 173-74; Kathryn Starshak,
It's the End of the World As Musicians Know It, Or Is It? Artists Battle the Record Industry and
Congress to Restore Their Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 71, 112
(2001).
167. 41 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D.N.J. 1999).
168. See Rafoth, supra note 4, at 1045 ("[T] he court in Ballas v. Tedesco held that 'sound
recordings are not a work-for-hire.'").
169. Ballas, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 541.
170. 128 F.3d 872 (5th Cir. 1997).
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because it found that the plaintiff's "copyright infringement claims
are foreclosed regardless of who owns the copyrights."'17' The court
added, "[t] his conclusion should not be construed as disposing of the
issue of who actually owns the copyrights to the ... jingles."172 To the
contrary, the court explicitly recognized that sound recordings (here,
musical sound recordings in the form of advertising 'jingles") can be
works for hire: "[A]ny copyrights that [co-plaintiff] Michlin would
otherwise own as creator of the jingles are owned by [co-plaintiff] Lu-
lirama pursuant to the work for hire doctrine because Michlin wrote
the jingles in the course and scope of his employment as president of
Lulirama." '7
Third, although the court in Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound174
stated in dicta that "a sound recording does not fit within any of the
nine categories of 'specially ordered or commissioned" works," 175 this
is an extremely limited view. The court later holds that it "does not
have sufficient information to determine whether [defendant] RAS is
the sole . . .owner [by work for hire] of the sound recording copy-
right."1 76 The fact remains that a sound recording can be a work made
for hire. Simply because "sound recordings" are no longer enumer-
ated as a category in the definition of works made for hire does not
exclude them from falling under another category. 77
For example, in Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc.,178 the court
found that "[t]here appears to be no question that musical composi-
tions created for inclusion in an audiovisual work such as a television
series are one of the categories of 'specially ordered or commis-
sioned" works that can be accorded work for hire status." 179 In that
case, plaintiff composer of music for a television show alleged, inter
alia, that he was the owner of the copyright and that the party that had
hired him to compose the music was not. 80 The court found that
plaintiff was indeed an independent contractor, the works composed
fell under the "specially ordered or commissioned" prong as included
171. Id. at 883.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 875 n.1.
174. 77 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 1999).
175. Id. at 64.
176. Id. at 64-65.
177. See generally 146 CONG. REC. H7245 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Berman) ("[S]ound recordings are eligible to be works made for hire within the nine, pre-
existing categories.").
178. 171 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
179. Id. at 1067-68.
180. See id. at 1059.
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in an audiovisual work, and that there was a writing to back it up, and
thus awarded ownership to the hiring party. 81
The determination of whether a musical recording is a work for
hire must therefore be made on a case-by-case basis. However, one can
easily envision the situation in which an album could be considered a
"collective work," and therefore a work for hire. Consider the situa-
tion presented at the beginning of this Comment. In order for the
album of the artist's songs to be considered a compilation or collec-
tive work, the following must occur: First, the record company must
specially commission the artist to record a number of songs. This ful-
fills the "specially ordered or commissioned" requirement. Second,
the artist and the record company must jointly sign a contract that
states that the works produced pursuant to the contract are works for
hire, fulfilling the "written instrument" requirement. Third, and most
importantly, after the artist has recorded his songs and delivered them
to the record company, the songs must be "selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole [could]
constitute[] an original work of authorship."'1 2 The album's pro-
ducer performs this step. However, the producer must be an em-
ployee of the record company, 8" or else the credit and thus
ownership of the copyright in the compilation would vest, in the pro-
ducer. Depending upon the level of innovation inherent in the selec-
tion, coordination, and arrangement of those tracks, the resulting
album could be considered a compilation or a collective work. 184 The
efforts of the record company resulting in the original work of author-
ship "are distinguishable from the work involved in creating each indi-
vidual work, such as selecting which musicians, technicians, and
studios to use on each recording."'18 5 The record album, as distin-
guished from the individual recording, also has a life of its own by
virtue of its promotion as a unit, its artwork, and its liner notes in-
cluded to provide the listener with information about the artist and
the recording.'18 If a record company includes more of these ele-
181. See id. at 1067-68.
182. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
183. See, e.g., Starshak, supra note 166, at 113 ("[Tlhe record company ... provides a
producer, designs the cover for the compact disc, and distributes the recording.") (citing
AFTRA, supra note 118).
184. See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 37, at 222-23; see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 4,
§ 3.02 at 3-7, ("It is not necessary that the contributions emanate from different authors. A
collective work may consist of 'collections of the discrete writings of the same author[ ].
... " (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 122 (1976)).
185. Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 37, at 222.
186. See id.
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ments, its argument of ownership as a work for hire by compilation
becomes stronger. 187
B. Contemporarily Recorded Songs as "Collective Works" or
"Compilations"
Much like the argument that an album can be considered a com-
pilation or collective work for the purposes of determining work for
hire status, the assertion can be extended to include the individual
sound recordings made using modern technology. In the hypothetical
situation presented above, 8 a series of separate tracks, each entitled
to copyright as the product of the individual musician's imagination
and improvisation, were separated compositionally and temporally. In
modern commercial recordings, it is not unusual to record tracks sep-
arately. Since the musicians an artist desires or requires may have con-
flicting schedules, the recordings may not occur simultaneously.
Regardless of when the recordings take place, gone are the days of a
group of musicians playing in one room into one microphone.
The song produced by the eventual mixing of the individual
tracks can be considered a 'joint work" 189 if the musicians are indeed
independent. Normal recording practice, however, is that either the
artist or the record company retains the side musicians.' 9° As such,
they are deemed either employees of the artist or of the record com-
pany, or independent contractors who assign their work to the artist
or the record company. Thus, ownership of their input into the re-
cordings will belong to the party who hired them.
After the musicians finish recording their tracks, it is the pro-
ducer's job to "edit or adapt the Masters to conform to technological
or commercial requirements in various formats now or hereafter
187. See id. at 223.
188. See supra at 783.
189. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. (Lexis 2001) (stating "[a] 'joint work' is a work prepared by
two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into insepara-
ble or interdependent parts of a unitary whole"). This in itself creates problems for the
work for hire doctrine. If a sound recording is considered ajoint work but is not a work for
hire, termination of the assignment would necessarily have to be with the consent of a
majority of the joint authors. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1) (1994). However, thirty-five years
after the original assignment the trail might be cold and it might be difficult to determine
who must assent to termination and whether a sufficient number of the joint authors have
joined in the decision to terminate. For an excellent treatment of this issue, see Mary
LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 392
(2001).
190. See SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 3, at 3.
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known or developed."' 1'9 In carrying out this task, the producer may
decide to eliminate a track in order to achieve a more commercially
and technically satisfactory sound.'92 Depending on how extensive
this alteration is and how creative the resulting track ends up, the pro-
ducer may be entitled to copyright the finished product as a collective
work or compilation. However, since the producer is an employee of
the record company, the work produced during the course of his em-
ployment (that is, the finished Master recording) will belong to the
company.' '1
The effect of an individual song being considered a work for hire
is that the artist will never regain copyright ownership in the work. To
that end, the record company can rerelease the song after it has been
released in album form, and it can also alter the song or include it in
an entirely different album or collective work.' ' 4 A record company
owning copyright to a song can release it in an "album version," a
"radio edit version," a "remix version," or an "instrumental version." If
a song is found to be a work for hire, essentially all that the artist gets
is whatever is left from the advance the company paid initially plus the
royalties on the sale of copies of the work. If the work is unsuccessful,
the artist may receive nothing for his labors. If the work is successful,
the artist could make some money off of the recording, but will not be
able to regain the copyright and shop the record after the transfer is
terminated.
V. Determination of Work for Hire Status
Inevitably, a court must determine whether sound recordings can
be deemed works for hire according to the facts of the case before it.
While a court has substantial discretion to so find, the Supreme Court
has attempted to clarify the first prong of Section 101 of the Copyright
Act.' 1 5 As such, a court may use the common law agency test in order
to determine whether a musical sound recording should be consid-
ered a work for hire.
If a court finds that a musician is not an employee of the record
company but rather an independent contractor, then the issue is
whether the circumstances surrounding the recording comport with
that of a compilation or a collective work. Like the employer-em-
191. 6 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 30.03A(2)(10.4).
192. See id.
193. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
194. See Schiffies, supra note 155, at 410 (citing H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 122 (1976)).
195. See Crnty. fbr Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
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ployee distinction, this determination is within a court's discretion,
but there is less guidance. However, the decisive inquiry is whether a
number of preexisting contributions are "selected, coordinated, or ar-
ranged" so that the resulting product constitutes a work entitled to
copyright, that is, has a modicum of originality and is fixed in a tangi-
ble medium of expression.
In considering whether a song or an album is a compilation or a
collective work, a court should consider a number of factors in addi-
tion to the existence of a written document and the fact that the works
were specially ordered or commissioned. First, what was the nature of
the relationship between the parties; for example, did the artist rely
heavily on the input of the employer or record producer? Second,
what was the manner in which the songs were recorded; for example,
were the tracks recorded in a disparate manner, either temporally or
locationally? Third, how were the songs treated by employees of the
record company after recording; for example, did the producer exert
a high level of influence and discretion over the final product?
Fourth, who had control over decisions with respect to how the songs
and the album were structured; for example, were most of the deci-
sions made by the producer in order to achieve that "commercially
satisfactory" sound or did the artist have free reign? Fifth, are there
issues surrounding termination; for example, are there multiple joint
authors who mustjoin in the notice of termination, or has the period
for termination passed? Sixth, since the evidentiary record is likely to
be old, will there be difficulty answering the above questions? These
questions should not be thought of as comprehensive-a court should
make a determination of work for hire status tailored to the factual
situation presented.
Conclusion
The impact on the recording industry and recording artists as to
whether musical sound recordings are works made for hire can have
enormous financial as well as social repercussions. Inevitably a flood
of litigation will ensue when artists begin to pursue their termination
rights in 2003.196 Since the work for hire doctrine eliminates the art-
ist's right to renegotiate through termination, the imposition of work
196. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (4) (1994) ("notice [of termination of a copyright transfer]
shall state the effective date of the termination.... and the notice shall be served not less
than two or more than ten years before that date"); see aLso § 203(a) (3) ("Termination of
the grant [of a copyright] may be effected at any time ... thirty-five years from the date of
exectution of the grant .... ) So, for copyrights transferred on January 1, 1978 (the effec-
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for hire status contravenes that right without any sacrifice on the part
of the record company. 197 Work for hire status for musical sound re-
cordings permits recording companies to exert an almost unconscion-
able amount of power over a fledgling recording artist inexperienced
in contract negotiations. The record company can gain copyright in
the artist's work in perpetuity by either bestowing upon the artist the
benefits of employment, or adding significant economic value to the
artist's work by compilation processes. 9 8 The artist can refuse the
contract initially and take his chances elsewhere. However, this repre-
sents a Hobson's choice: the artist can either record music but never
again own his work, or continue to struggle to make money but retain
ownership of the fruits of his creative genius. For the record company,
work for hire means perpetual ownership of a potential cash cow with
only a relatively nominal investment. Sounds like money for nothing
and tracks for free.
tive date of the current Act), termination may occur on January 1, 2013, and notice of
termination may begin to occur on January 1, 2003.
197. See Rafoth, supra note 4, at 1052; see also 3 NIMMER, supra note 4, § 11.07 (stating
that a purchaser of copyrights "may not exert greater bargaining power so as to require the
author to agree to surrender his or her future right of termination").
198. See Rafoth, supra note 4, at 1051.
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